Starting with the very first commit, the update was always done with
two api calls: one for DELETE and one for REPLACE. It is however
perfectly valid and save to do both at once, which makes it atomic, so
no need for the rollback. Plus it only updates the serial once.
There is no point in sending the full RRset data when deleting it, the
key attributes to identify it are enough. This also make the behaviour
consistent with the api docs [0] where it says "MUST NOT be included
when changetype is set to DELETE."
[0] https://doc.powerdns.com/authoritative/http-api/zone.html#rrset
Setting this attribute on a cookie marks it as non-cross-site, so it
is only send in requests to our own server. It is reasonable that no
one else should need our session or csrf data. Setting it explicitly
also prevents any issues from the ongoing change in browser behaviour [0]
when it is unset.
Seasurf supports the SameSite attribute starting with v0.3. As nothing
obviously broke, I used the opportunity and updated all the way to the
most recent version.
The SeaSurf default for SameSite is already `Lax`, so it only needs to
be set for the session cookie.
[0] https://developers.google.com/search/blog/2020/01/get-ready-for-new-samesitenone-secure
CSRF has been initialized *before* the app config was fully read. That
made it impossible to configure CSRF properly. Moved the CSRF init into
the routes module, and switched from programmatic to decorated
exemptions. GET routes don't need to be exempted because they are by
default.
When enabled, forbids the creation of a domain if it exists as a record in one of its parent domains (administrators and operators are not limited though).
There is a misspelling of rrset throughout the history logic, which also
effects the json payload in the database. Code-wise this is a simple
search-and-replace, and the migration will fix the payloads.
Semantically and syntactically it is better to have the same number of
`<th>` as `<td>`. Not that anyone will ever see that new header, since
that column is always invisible (except if the user disables javascript).
Plus remove a unmatched closing html element.
As vermin [0] confirms, the codebase has long moved beyond supporting
python v2 (which is not a bad thing). This removes the last explicit py2
piece of code.
And in case anyone wonders, vermin currently reports the minium version
to be v3.6.
[0] https://pypi.org/project/vermin/
* Previously having characters like "ü" in the SOA wouldnt allow to push
updates to the domain
* Also use the new method to_idna to support characters like "ß"
Previously strings with characters like "ß" would throw and exception
This seems to happen because the lib behind encode().decode('idna')
cant handle characters like this
- Store HTML for modal window inside an invisible <div> element instead
of inside the <button> element's value attribute
- Mark history.detailed_msg as safe as it is already manually run
through the template engine beforehand and would be broken if escaped
a second time
If the 'otp_force' and 'otp_field_enabled' basic settings are both enabled, automatically enable 2FA for the user after login or signup, if needed, by setting a new OTP secret. Redirect the user to a welcome page for scanning the QR code.
Also show the secret key in ASCII form on the user profile page for easier copying into other applications.
- Run HTML through the template engine, preventing XSS from various
vectors
- Fix uncaught exception when a history entry about domain template
deletion is processed
- Adapt indentation to 4 space characters per level
The order of account names returned by User.get_accounts() affects the
order account names are displyed in on /domain/add if the current user
neither has the Administrator role nor the Operator role and the
`allow_user_create_domain` setting is enabled at the same time.
If the current user does have the Administrator or Operator role,
routes.domain.add() already returns accounts ordered by name, so this
change makes it consistent.
The implementation of `random.choice()` uses the Mersenne Twister, the
output of which is predictable by observing previous output, and is as
such unsuitable for security-sensitive applications. A cryptographically
secure pseudorandom number generator - which the `secrets` module relies
on - should be used instead in those instances.
When creating a new local user, there is a chance that, due to a copy &
paste or typing error, whitespace will be introduced at the start or end
of the username. This can lead to issues when trying to log in using the
affected username, as such a condition can easily be overlooked - no
user will be found in the database if entering the username without the
aforementioned whitespace. This commit therefore strip()s the username
string within routes/{admin,index}.py.
The firstname, lastname and email strings within
routes/{admin,index,user}.py are also strip()ped on this occasion.
